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Hearing Reports Under the
Environmental Conservation Law: Their
Function, Preparation, and Importance
Daniel A. Ruzow & J. Langdon Marsh*
I. Introduction
The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC)
was created by the New York State Legislature in 1970 to
carry out the environmental policy of New York.1 Each year
the Commissioner of DEC issues over 100 decisions and or-
ders following quasi-judicial or adjudicatory proceedings con-
ducted by DEC's Administrative Law Judges. The adjudica-
tory proceedings conducted by DEC fall into two broad
categories: 1) administrative enforcement hearings2 that are
brought against persons who have allegedly violated New
York's environmental laws, and 2) administrative permit or li-
censing hearings,3 where an application for a permit is made
* Daniel A. Ruzow, Esq., is affiliated with Whiteman Osterman & Hanna, Al-
bany, New York and was formerly Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner's
Counsel for Hearings of the New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion. J. Langdon Marsh, Esq., is the Executive Deputy Commissioner of the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Albany, New York.
This article is drawn from remarks made by the authors at a seminar for Admin-
istrative Law Judges of the N.Y.S. Department of Environmental Conservation con-
ducted by the Environmental Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York in April of 1984.
1. See generally N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 1-0101 (McKinney 1984) (the envi-
ronmental policy of New York). Under the Environmental Conservation Law, the
head of the Department of Environmental Conservation is the Commissioner, who is
appointed by the Governor, by arid with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Commissioner holds office at the pleasure of the Governor by whom he was ap-
pointed, and until a qualified successor is appointed. Id. at § 3-0103.
2. See N.Y. A.P.A. §§ 301-307 (McKinney 1984) (Adjudicatory Proceedings);
N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 622 (1978) (Uniform Enforcement Hearing Procedures,
which are authorized by N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-1709(8)).
3. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 401 (Licenses); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 70-0119 (Public
Hearings); N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 624 (1981) (Permit Hearing Procedures, which
1
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in order to undertake an activity regulated under the Envi-
ronmental Conservation Law (ECL),4 and it is contested by
either DEC regulatory staff or an interested member of the
public.
In each of these hearings, the Administrative Law Judge
prepares a comprehensive hearing report that contains a sum-
mary of the proceedings, the findings of fact, and the conclu-
sions drawn.5 With rare exception, the Commissioner adopts
the hearing report as the Department's decision, including
adoption in full of its findings of fact and conclusions. Addi-
tionally, the Commissioner may expound upon matters raised
in the hearing report or in the record in a manner which sup-
plements or modifies statements, findings, or conclusions
made by the Administrative Law Judge. Taken together, the
Administrative Law Judge's hearing report and the additional
comments made by the Commissioner constitute the final de-
cision rendered by DEC.
Decisions which are issued following adjudicatory pro-
ceedings must comply with the requirements of the State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (SAPA) § 307.6 Subdivision 1 of
this section provides in pertinent part that:
A final decision, determination or order adverse to a party
in an adjudicatory proceeding shall be in writing or stated
in the record and shall include findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or reasons for the decision, determination
or order. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory lan-
guage, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit
statement of the underlying facts supporting the
findings.7
The Commissioner of DEC relies heavily on the findings
of fact and conclusions contained in the hearing reports and
are authorized by N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 70-0107(1)).
4. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602.
5. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 624.7(d).
6. N.Y. A.P.A. § 307 (Decisions, determinations and orders); see also id. § 401
(Licenses).
7. Id. § 307(1).
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such reports are therefore used to decide important cases and
to satisfy SAPA's requirements. Accordingly, Administrative
Law Judges have a critical role in the development of the ad-
ministrative law of the Department and must ensure that the
hearing reports continue to reflect the high standards ex-
pected by the Commissioner, the DEC, and the public at
large.
This Article explores the principal functions served by
the administrative hearing reports that are prepared by the
Administrative Law Judges within DEC, and also reviews ju-
dicial challenges to administrative decisions which may be
based upon the administrative hearing reports.
II. Functions of the Hearing Report
A hearing report serves four principal functions:
1) as a vehicle for the adjudication of contested fac-
tual and legal issues;
2) as a main basis for regulatory decision making by
the Commissioner;
3) as a final environmental impact statement (FEIS)
required by the State Environmental Quality Review
Act,8 but only when DEC is the lead agency and a draft
environmental impact statement (DEIS) has already
been submitted as a part of the permit application;9 and
4) as a legal and technical precedent in DEC's ad-
ministration of environmental laws.
A. Adjudication
The resolution of the facts and legal issues raised in
8. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 1984).
9. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law 88 8-0101 to -0117 (the requirements governing the
preparation, filing, and consideration of environmental impact statements); N.Y. Ad-
min. Code tit. 6, § 617 (1978) (implementing regulations, which are authorized by
N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0113). The Permit Hearing Procedures that are out-
lined in the N.Y. Admin. Code also contain provisions regarding preparation of the
DEIS. See N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, §§ 624.3, 624.6, 624.7, 624.10, 624.15, 624.16
(1981).
1985]
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DEC's permit and enforcement hearings is one of the greatest
responsibilities of the Department's Administrative Law
Judges. They fulfill this responsibility by assuring that a com-
plete evidentiary record is developed, and by preparing writ-
ten findings of fact and conclusions relating to evidence pro-
duced in the administrative hearing record. Through careful
and time consuming analytical study, the Administrative Law
Judges adjudicate the contested issues of fact and law, and set
forth the results of their analysis in the hearing report.
DEC's adjudicatory proceedings have grown more compli-
cated as its regulatory framework has expanded and as the
complexity and sophistication of the scientific, engineering,
and technical world in which DEC operates have grown. New
statutes have been enacted almost annually since the codifica-
tion of the ECL in 1972.10 DEC's regulations have similarly
grown in volume and complexity in an attempt to contend
with each new environmental problem and crisis. Regulations
governing solid waste disposal, for example, have expanded
from a few pages in 1972 to hundreds of pages in 1985 relating
to transportation, construction, operation, and monitoring
requirements.1
The liability for violations of the ECL in terms of penal-
ties and the costs of remediation has also expanded. For ex-
ample, the civil penalties which the Commissioner can assess
for hazardous waste violations are now as high as $25,000 per
violation and $50,000 for a second violation.12 Unfortunately,
10. See Explanation to N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law at III.
11. See N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, §§ 360-373 (1985).
12. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-2705. Note that § 71-2705(1) also provides, in
the instance of a first violation "an additional penalty of not more than twenty-five
thousand dollars for each day during which such violation continues ...." Id. In
addition, injunctive relief, revocation or suspension of a permit, or denial of a pend-
ing permit renewal application may be imposed upon the violator. A comparable pen-
alty of fifty thousand dollars exists for a second violation. Criminal sanctions, as pro-
vided in § 71-2705(2), include a possible misdemeanor charge along with a fine. Id.
Felony provisions were enacted in 1981. See §§ 71-2707 to -2721.
According to the McKinney's Practice Commentary following § 71-2707 and writ-
ten by Philip Weinberg, "This, and the sections through 71-2721 make the unautho-
rized knowing possession or disposal of hazardous waste, and related crimes, class D
and class E felonies .... They indicate the most serious intent on the part of the
Legislature to enforce the hazardous waste articles stringently, in recognition of the
[Vol. 2
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the exposure to such potential civil liability almost guarantees
the presence of defense attorneys who are skilled in trial
strategies that are designed to delay administrative adjudica-
tion as well as to defeat administrative charges.
A new complicating factor in fact finding is the growing
trend towards consideration of scientific facts and judgments
on acceptable levels of risk. For example, an "ultimate fact"13
to be found by an Administrative Law Judge may be whether
a permit limitation is acceptable if it does not reduce the risk
from toxic contamination to a level which can feasibly or eco-
nomically be met, even if the scientific evidence is inconclu-
sive. The adjudicatory or fact finding process is further com-
plicated by existing regulatory standards which are often
subjective and readily capable of varied interpretation. Given
the nature of the environmental sciences, often the only cer-
tainty that can be expected is that no two experts will share
the same opinion. Nevertheless, findings of fact must be
made.
Kenneth Culp Davis, in his Administrative Law Text, dif-
ferentiates between two types of facts: ultimate facts and ba-
sic facts. An ultimate fact is one which is usually expressed in
the language of the statutory standard. For example, "the rate
is reasonable"; "the action is in the public interest.""' Today,
we would generally call these facts the conclusions. The basic
facts are those facts gleaned from the evidence which support
the ultimate fact or conclusion. 15 According to Davis,
severe consequences of improper handling and disposal of these substances." Id. § 71-
2707 commentary. Depending on the offense charged, penalties under the felony en-
forcement provisions include fines of $100,000 or double the amount of the defen-
dant's gain, whichever is higher, or, following a hearing, the cost of restoration, a
possible prison term, or a combination of these. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-2721.
13. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 16.04 (1972).
14. Id
15. Id. Another administrative law commentator also explains that:
[It is an indispensable prerequisite to effective judicial review that the
agency's decision set forth the findings of basic fact, as well as the conclu-
sions of ultimate fact and conclusions of law derived therefrom .... Obvi-
ously, unless the findings of basic fact are stated, the reviewing court cannot
effectively discharge its responsibilities in determining whether there was
substantial evidence to support the basic findings, or whether the basic find-
ings supported the conclusion of ultimate fact.... It is not easy, of course, to
1985]
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[flacts might theoretically be lined up on a scale from the
most specific to the most general. At one end is each
statement of each witness, then a summary of the testi-
mony of each witness, then a summary of the testimony
and other evidence on each side, then the basic findings,
and at the opposite end the ultimate findings. Courts do
not want agencies to include detailed summaries of testi-
mony in their findings; they want what they call the basic
facts. 6
In the context of DEC's adjudication of multi-party,
multi-issue permit applications, findings of fact tend to be ex-
tensive and multi-tiered. For example, in order to predict
whether air emissions will meet federal standards, findings
may be required on the proper modeling techniques, prevail-
ing wind velocities and directions, topographical features,
stack heights, plume characteristics, etc. Conflicting expert
testimony may be present in the record concerning any or all
of these facts. Determining which facts should be relied on is
essential in order for the ultimate decision to be rendered.
However, findings need not be made on every subsidiary evi-
dentiary fact, argument, or immaterial issue. 17 Where multiple
experts testify and reach different conclusions based upon the
same facts, credibility of the witness may play an important
role in resolving the conflicts between the experts. Where such
credibility is an important factor, it may be necessary to recite
this fact in the report."8
Administrative Law Judges' conclusions play a critical
role in the adjudication process. The compliance of a permit
application with the applicable statutory and regulatory stan-
dards is resolved in the conclusions. In enforcement actions,
determine in every case which are the 'ultimate' and which the 'basic' facts.
Whether an individual was employed by a company might be a basic fact
under some circumstances; but in a different situation, this issue might be
the ultimate point in controversy.
F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 465, 467, 475 (1965).
16. Davis, supra note 13, § 16.04.
17. L. Modjeska, Administrative Law Practice and Procedure 161 (1982); 2 Fed.
Proc., Law. Ed. § 2:183 (1981); 5 Ad. L. (MB) § 39.05, at 39-21 (1983).
18. See Envtl. Defense Fund v. Flacke, 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1983).
[Vol. 2
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the Administrative Law Judge's conclusions address whether
or not a violation has taken place, the extent of the offender's
penal liability, and the appropriateness of remediation. In
writing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judges have the
opportunity and responsibility to explain the means by which
they arrived at a conclusion regarding regulatory compliance.
They must weave together a myriad of findings of fact (which
at times may seem to have no connection with each other)
into a rational, logical and reasonable explanation. The more
complex issues have a greater need for facts,19 and the Admin-
istrative Law Judge therefore has a greater responsibility to
explain the basis of the conclusion by tying together the perti-
nent facts as they are found.
B. Basis for Decision Making
The second important function of the hearing report is to
provide a basis for the Commissioner to reach a final deci-
sion.2 0 As noted above, the Commissioner relies heavily on the
hearing report which generally provides the Commissioner
with a road map into the record of the adjudicatory proceed-
ing.2 It provides an essential link to the record by identifying
19. See Shermack v. Bd. of Regents, 64 A.D.2d 798, 799, 407 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928
(1978).
20. In enforcement-related hearings, the hearing officer [Administrative Law
Judge] must prepare and submit his report to the Commissioner within 30 days of
the close of the hearing. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 622.13. The Commissioner then
has 30 days after receipt of the hearing report to make a final determination based
upon the record that is submitted to him. Id. § 622.14(a). In permit-related hearings,
although there is no specific period of time designated within which the Administra-
tive Law Judge must foward his report to the Commissioner, see id. § 624.7(d), the
Commissioner must make his decision within 60 days after the official closing of the
hearing record. Id. § 624.15(a).
21. The regulations concerning permit hearings specifically state that "[tJhe
Commissioner's decision shall be made upon consideration of the report and complete
record, supported by substantial evidence and shall be in writing stating the reasons
for the action taken." Id. § 624.15(b). The regulations concerning enforcement hear-
ings state in relevant part that, "[t]he final determination shall be embodied in a final
order which shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law or reasons for the
final determination ...." Id. § 622.14(b). It is therefore important that an Admin-
strative Law Judge provide an evidentiary basis in his report so that the Commis-
sioner may justifiably rely upon the report when making his final determination.
7
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the parties, and summarizing their principal arguments, the
legal issues to be decided, the evidence found by the Adminis-
trative Law Judge to be persuasive, important policy issues,
and varying interpretations of departmental regulations that
are asserted by the parties.
In the process of adjudicating the contested factual and
legal issues, it is obvious, but worthy of repetition, that the
Administrative Law Judges must base their judgments on evi-
dentiary matters in the record. Ultimately, as discussed below,
the absence of supporting evidence can defeat a decision not-
withstanding an erudite recital of the importance and true
meaning of the statute. As a practical matter, the Commis-
sioner will not know whether every finding is supported by
evidence in the record and therefore has entrusted the crea-
tion and control of the record and its ultimate review to the
Administrative Law Judge.
In the process of distinguishing between those facts which
must be found and those which, while interesting and form a
part of the evidentiary record, are not critical to the determi-
nation of the statutory requirements or issues identified for
adjudication, utilization of the briefs submitted by the parties
may play an important role in an adjudicatory proceeding.
Since the issues focused on by the parties in post-hearing
briefs are more than likely to be the ones critical to the ulti-
mate determination, using the briefs as a checklist of the fac-
tual and legal issues in contention appears to be a useful
practice.22
C. Use of the Hearing Report as the FEIS
In 1975, New York enacted the State Environmental
Quality Review Act (SEQRA), 23 which is "considered by
many to be an environmental bill of rights, establishing envi-
ronmental values as equal to other public values in govern-
22. The regulations concerning permit hearings provide in pertinent part that,
"[alt the concluding session of the hearing, the AIJ will determine whether to allow
the submission of written post-hearing briefs and proposed findings of fact." N.Y.
Admin. Code tit. 6, § 624.7(a)(7).
23. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0101.
[Vol. 2
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mental action. ' 24 The act was created by using the National
Environmental Policy Act of 196925 and the miniature ver-
sions of this statute enacted in California 2  and Washington"'
as guidelines.2 8
Since legislators were uncertain of the changes that would
be caused by the enactment of SEQRA, its full implementa-
tion was twice postponed until November 1, 1978, when it fi-
nally became effective for all levels of government.2" Under
the law, DEC was charged with adopting regulations for the
implementation of SEQRA,30 and accordingly DEC issued its
final set of regulations on September 1, 1978.1'
Of the three basic mandates imposed by SEQRA, the
third and most widely known mandate is that agencies or ap-
plicants for permits or approvals prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS) "on any action they propose or ap-
prove which may have a significant effect on the environ-
ment. '3 2 To avoid multiple, uncoordinated environmental re-
24. Marsh, Symposium on the N.Y.S. Envtl. Quality Review Act Introduc-
tion-SEQRA's Scope and Objectives, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1097 (1982).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
26. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000-21177 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
27. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 43.21C.010 to .914 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
28. Robinson, SEQRA's Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA's in the Sister
States, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1155, 1157 (1982).
29. Marsh, supra note 24, at 1105.
30. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0113. However, DEC has no authority to en-
force the regulations it has adopted. Such responsibility has been left to the courts,
"acting at the request of individual citizens, public interest groups, businesses and
units of government affected by particular actions, to require that the regulations be
obeyed." Marsh, supra note 24, at 1106.
31. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617. "These regulations took effect November 1,
1978. A minor amendment was adopted effective December 12, 1978." Marsh, supra
note 24, at 1105 n.46.
32. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(2). The first basic mandate imposes an
affirmative duty on local and state agencies to
review their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and cur-
rent policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there
are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance
with the purposes and provisions of this article [SEQRA], and shall recom-
mend or effect such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority
and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures set
forth in this article.
Id. § 8-0107.
9
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views and the possibility that each agency involved with a
particular action would make a different determination of sig-
nificance, the "lead agency" concept was developed by the
legislature. 33
Guidance about how to choose a lead agency is available
in DEC's regulations.34 The regulations also provide a dispute
resolution mechanism which permits the DEC Commissioner
to act as an arbitrator between several agencies, whether or
not DEC is an involved agency in the matter.3 5 If the agencies
cannot agree, the Commissioner will choose the lead agency
based upon a consideration of priorities detailed in the DEC
regulations. 36
When DEC is the lead agency under SEQRA and a DEIS
has been prepared and submitted by an applicant, DEC has
placed the responsibility for preparation of the FEIS on the
Administrative Law Judge when the application is made the
subject of an adjudicatory proceeding.3 7 This added responsi-
bility broadens the scope of relevant inquiry beyond DEC's
traditional program or permit areas. When a DEIS accompa-
nies an application, the issues encountered by DEC may con-
cern land use, neighborhood character, public safety, and his-
toric preservation, among others. All must be addressed in the
hearing report.38
The hearing report that will serve as the FEIS must sat-
isfy additional requirements to those enumerated above.
These include utilizing a topical organization which facilitates
reference to various portions of the report, and responds to
The second basic mandate is that
[a]gencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and goals set
forth in this article, and shall act and choose alternatives which, consistent
with social, economic, and other essential considerations, to the maximum
extent practicable, minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects, includ-
ing effects revealed in the evironmental impact statement process.
Id. § 8-0109(1).
33. Marsh, supra note 24, at 1110; see N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8- 0111(6).
34. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.6(d).
35. Id. § 617.6(e).
36. Id.
37. See id. § 624.7.
38. See id. § 617.11.
[Vol. 2
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substantive comments on the DEIS whether or not the mat-
ters are adjudicated. For those matters which are adjudicated,
findings of fact and conclusions should be structured so that
they are in fact responsive to the comments raised. For exam-
ple, if the DEIS finds evidence of adverse environmental ef-
fects that may be caused by the proposed action, the FEIS
under SEQRA must "fully review adverse environmental ef-
fects and identify alternatives, but viable steps for mitigating
those effects must also be discussed." 39 For those matters
which are not adjudicated, the applicant's and other parties'
responses must be clearly labeled and identified as part of the
FEIS.
The FEIS will also serve as the environmental record for
all other involved agencies that have decision-making roles.
Accordingly, organization of the report should attempt to fa-
cilitate use of the FEIS by these agencies to the greatest ex-
tent possible.
Lastly, the hearing report will provide the factual basis
for the "findings" required to be made under SEQRA40 by the
Commissioner. The conclusions must address all contested is-
sues, including economic and social matters, in addition to the
environmental issues that arise from specific regulatory re-
quirements and those issues arising from SEQRA's supple-
mental authority.41 Since the EIS process mandated by
SEQRA is enforced by judicial review of the agency action,
the "lead agency must compile a careful record documenting
the EIS process. This record is the basis for determining both
the procedural correctness and the substantive reasonableness
of the agency's decision. '4 2
39. Robinson, supra note 28, at 1173.
40. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(8); N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.9.
41. See Town of Henrietta v. Flacke, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1980).
42. Robinson, supra note 28, at 1174 (citing Norway Hill Preservation & Protec-
tion Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 275-76, 552 P.2d 674, 679 (1976);
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 409, 419, 256 N.W.2d
149, 155 (1977)).
1985]
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D. Hearing Reports as Precedent
Hearing reports also serve as important legal and techni-
cal precedent for DEC administrative action. As discussed be-
low, there are relatively few judicial decisions which discuss or
interpret the ECL and its implementing regulations. The
courts' deference to the expertise of administrative agencies,
coupled with the substantial evidence rule governing judicial
review, 43 has resulted in even fewer cases which evaluate the
reasonableness of DEC's technical requirements. The hearing
reports therefore provide a rare opportunity for the regulated
community to obtain DEC's viewpoint on a variety of techni-
cal matters.
Due to a dearth of generally available legal precedent re-
garding the ECL, the value to the regulated community of
DEC's administrative determinations cannot be overstated.
Indeed, recent amendments to SAPA now require the mainte-
nance by state agencies of an index to all decisions issued af-
ter adjudicatory proceedings by both name and subject.44 Re-
cent law review articles have highlighted the existence and
importance of DEC's administrative decisions for purposes of
guidance in implementing SEQRA.46 Members of the environ-
mental legal community who regularly practice before DEC
have begun to raise prior decisions of DEC as precedent in
subsequent proceedings, and urge adherence to the prior hold-
ings established therein on the basis of stare decisis.
DEC now widely distributes the Commissioner's deci-
sions, including the hearing reports, within DEC in order to
promote uniformity and consistency between programs and
43. See Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 271 N.E.2d 528, 529-30 (1971);
Town of Hempstead v. Flacke, 82 A.D.2d 183, 441 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1981); see also N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1985); N.Y. A.P.A. § 306; 300 Gramatan Ave.
Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 379 N.E.2d 1183 (1978) (discus-
sion of the "substantial evidence" rule).
44. N.Y. A.P.A. § 307(3) (added by chapter 504 of the laws of 1983).
45. Ulasewicz, The Department of Environmental Conservation and SEQRA:
Upholding its Mandates and Charting Parameters for the Elusive Socio- Economic
Assessment, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1255 (1982); Levine, The New York State Environmen-
tal Quality Review Act of 1975: An Analysis of the Parties' Responsibilities in the
Review/Permit Request Process, 12 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1 (1984).
[Vol. 2
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regions. The hearing reports and ensuing decisions often in-
volve novel interpretations -of regulations that have wide ap-
plicability throughout DEC, and their distribution aids in the
uniform administration of DEC's environmental mandates.
III. Discussion: Challenges to Administrative Hearing
Reports
A. "Older" Law and Decisions
Approximately thirty percent (30%) of the decisions and
orders issued by the Commissioner each year are challenged in
judicial proceedings brought pursuant to Article 78 of the
CPLR.4 6 Petitions challenging these decisions normally allege
that the decision was arbitrary or capricious and/or was not
supported by substantial evidence.4 7 There are only a handful
of cases either decided or pending which have specifically
challenged the adequacy of the findings of the Administrative
Law Judge. In three of the decided cases,48 the adequacy of
the hearing reports was upheld. However, the petitioners did
not specifically rely on the requirements of SAPA § 307.1 as
the basis for their challenge.
SAPA was enacted in 1975 and the provisons of § 307.1
have not been the subject of extensive litigation. The few
cases decided are discussed below. By comparison, the provi-
46. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1985). Section 7801 states in rele-
vant part that, "[rielief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review, manda-
mus or prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article." Id. § 7801.
Unless otherwise provided by law, a determination may not be challenged by a pro-
ceeding under this article if it is not final, or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to
a court, or some other body, or officer, where such party is expressly authorized by
statute to rehear the matter. However, if the determination was made on rehearing,
or a rehearing was denied, or the time in which a rehearing can be requested has
elapsed, an Article 78 proceeding may ensue. Lastly, a determination may not be
challenged under an Article 78 proceeding if it was made in a civil or criminal matter,
"unless it is an order summarily punishing a contempt committed in the presence of
the court." Id.
47. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7803(3), (4).
48. See Lovett v. Flacke, 83 A.D.2d 718, 442 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1981); Envtl. Defense
Fund v. Flacke, 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1983); Power Auth. of the State of
N.Y. v. Flacke, 94 A.D.2d 69, 464 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1983).
1985]
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sions of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ,4 set
forth in 5 U.S.C. § 557, contain an analogous requirement for
findings and have been the subject of many federal court
decisions.50
Prior to the codification of the requirement for written
findings and conclusions, a common law requirement was
adopted by federal and state courts. Kenneth Culp Davis, in
his Administrative Law Text, identifies "practical reasons" for
the evolution of the common law requirement of findings:
"The reasons have to do with facilitating judicial review,
avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, as-
suring more careful administrative consideration, helping par-
ties plan their cases for rehearings and judicial review, and
keeping agencies within their jurisdiction. 5
In an early U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning the
challenge of an Interstate Commerce Commission rate deter-
mination, the Court had difficulty in understanding the basis
for. the Commission's determination. Justice Cardozo
explained,
[t]he difficulty is that it [the Commission] has not said so
with the simplicity and clearness through which a halting
impression ripens into reasonable certitude. In the end we
are left to spell out, to argue, to choose between conflict-
ing inferences. Something more precise is requisite in the
quasi-jurisdictional findings of an administrative
agency .... We must know what a decision means before
the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or
wrong.52
In an early New York case, Elite Dairy Products v. Ten
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
50. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.S. § 557 annot. cases (Law. Co-op. 1985), 5 U.S.C.A. § 557
annot. cases (West 1985). A similar findings requirement for federal judges deciding
civil cases without juries, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, has generated a large body of federal
case law involving the adequacy of findings by the courts. See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 52
annot. cases (West 1985).
51. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 16.03 (1972).
52. United States v. Chicago, M.,St.P.& P.R.Co., 294 U.S. 499 (1935).
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Eyck,53 the Court of Appeals reviewed a determination under
a statute which provided that milk licenses could not be
granted
unless the commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is
qualified by character, experience, financial responsibility
and equipment to properly conduct the proposed busi-
ness, that the issuance of the license will not tend to a
destructive competition in a market already adequately
served, and that issuance of the license is in the public
interest. 54
As noted by Davis, "[flor the court to review the bulky record
without knowing which of the six factors the commissioner
found to be lacking would obviously be wasteful."'5 5 The Court
of Appeals went on to hold that, "[o]nly after the commis-
sioner has made findings of fact can the court decide whether
the findings are sustained by the evidence ....
In another important New York case involving an "ances-
tor" Commission of DEC, a decision by the Water Power and
Control Commission was overturned for failure to make fac-
tual findings.5 7 The findings made by the Commission were
limited to the statutory requirements set forth in the Conser-
vation Law § 523 (predecessor to ECL § 15-1503). The court
held that,
[iun the absence of separate findings of fact, the conclu-
sions last quoted above, although cast in language sug-
gested by the statute... cannot be regarded as sufficient
to support the Commission's determination .... It [the
applicant] is entitled to findings by which it may know
upon what factual basis rests the Commission's
determination.
Findings of fact in support of decisions by courts and
administrative boards alike serve to give assurance to par-
53. 271 N.Y. 488, 3 N.E.2d 606 (1936).
54. Id. at 494.
55. Davis, supra note 51, § 16.03.
56. Elite Dairy Products, 271 N.Y. at 498.
57. New York Water Service Corp., 283 N.Y. 23, 27 N.E.2d 221 (1940).
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ties concerned that the decisions are based upon evidence
of record and were not reached arbitrarily or influenced
by extra-legal considerations. Where, as in this instance, a
statutory review of the decision may be had... findings
of fact in some form are essential to enable the parties
and any appellate court intelligently to determine
whether the decision follows as a matter of law from the
facts stated as its basis and whether the findings of fact
have any substantial support in the record.5 8
The Court of Appeals' decision, holding that mere statu-
tory conclusions are insufficient, has been reaffirmed several
times over the years.5 9
B. "More Recent" Law
In Montauk Improvement Inc. v. Proccacino,60 the Court
of Appeals held that,
[a] court cannot surmise or speculate as to how or why an
agency reached a particular conclusion. Failure of the
agency to set forth an adequate statement of the factual
basis for the determination forecloses the possibility of
fair judicial review and deprives the petitioner of his stat-
utory right to such review ......
This rule has also been applied by the Court of Appeals to
zoning cases by requiring zoning boards of appeal to make
written findings.2
The above discussion makes patently clear the require-
ment that findings of fact must be made, and that in order for
such findings to be sustained, they cannot merely parrot stat-
utory requirements. However, there are fewer cases with even
less consistency on the question of the degree of specificity
58. Id. at 30.
59. See Montauk Improvement Inc. v. Proccacino, 41 N.Y.2d 913, 363 N.E.2d
344 (1977); Simpson v. Wolansky, 38 N.Y.2d 391, 343 N.E.2d 274 (1975); Barry v.
O'Connell, 303 N.Y. 46, 100 N.E.2d 127 (1951).
60. 41 N.Y.2d 913.
61. Id. at 914.
62. See Syracuse Aggregate v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278, 414 N.E.2d 651 (1980).
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necessary for findings of fact. On the subject of ultimate facts,
the Supreme Court has explained that the "ultimate finding is
a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed
question of law and fact."63 Nevertheless, according to the
Court in United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, an ulti-
mate finding is not enough in the absence of a basic finding to
support it. "' On the subject of basic findings, which are some-
where between ultimate findings and a summary of each bit of
evidence,"3 a federal court of appeals has held that "[t]he de-
cisions require a commission in a quasi-judicial proceeding to
make basic findings supported by evidence and ultimate find-
ings which flow rationally from the basic findings "6.... 6 Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, "findings based on the evi-
dence must embrace the basic facts which are needed to
sustain the order. ' ' 67 Lastly, the Court in Pierce Auto Freight
Lines has found: "given that the report contains all the essen-
tial findings required . . . the Commissioner is not compelled
to annotate to each finding the evidence supporting it."6 8
Accordingly, when the findings are too general, the re-
viewing court may have difficulty filling the gap between the
evidence and the general findings; when they are too detailed,
the court may want something by way of 'basic findings' in
the nature of a summary.6 9
There are several recent New York cases which provide
some more specific guidance on the adequacy of findings of
fact. In Shermack v. Bd. of Regents, 70 decided under SAPA §
307, the petitioner's license to practice pharmacy was revoked
following a finding that he dispensed prescription drugs with-
out a prescription. Petitioner claimed that he had contacted
the prescribing doctor by phone and had received an oral pre-
63. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937).
64. 327 U.S. 515, 533 (1946).
65. Davis, supra note 51, § 16.04.
66. Capital Transit Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 213 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
67. Morgan v. United States, 289 U.S. 468, 480 (1936).
68. 327 U.S. at 529.
69. Davis, supra note 51, § 16.04.
70. 64 A.D.2d 798, 407 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1978).
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scription. The findings of fact recited that on the five days in
question, petitioner, without a prescription, dispensed certain
drugs in an unlabeled container. While it affirmed the revoca-
tion, the court held that, "it would have been better if the
respondent [Board of Regents] had explicitly commented on
the petitioner's defense, but in the relatively simple context of
this case the factual findings made are minimally adequate."
The Appellate Division's use of the expression "minimally
adequate" is important to note since it implies that the more
complicated the facts, the greater the extent of findings neces-
sary to support the ultimate determination.
In Mohawk Airlines, Inc. v. Tully,72 the airline asserted
that it was not liable for use taxes on inventory that is pur-
chased out of New York State and shipped to Pittsburgh. The
airline placed in evidence a copy of a letter to its vendors di-
recting them to alter the shipping of certain parts from Utica
to Pittsburgh, as well as an affidavit from the individual who
mailed the letter. The finding of fact concerning this transac-
tion reads as follows:
(14) Applicant Allegheny contends that parts destined for
New York and included in the Sales Tax Bureau's Audit
were never received in New York. A letter allegedly sent
to suppliers which advised them to divert shipments of
parts scheduled for delivery to Utica, New York, to a
point outside the State, was offered in evidence. 73
After reviewing what was obviously a mere summary of the
evidence in the record, Appellate Division ruled that
"[p]aragraph 14 is plainly not a finding of fact (see State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, § 307, subd. 1) and the commis-
sioner never even resolved the issue in its decision. On re-
mand, the question must be decided. '7 4
In another Appellate Division case involving alleged vio-
71. Id. at 799.
72. 75 A.D.2d 249, 429 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1980).
73. Id. at 253.
74. Id.
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lations by a nursing home of the State Hospital Code, the
court observed:
For example, as to finding 7kk (violation of 731.2[b][6]
[orientation to be given to nurses]) the department's ex-
pert (whose testimony is cited in finding 7kk) thought the
nursing orientation was inadequate because the 'orienta-
tion program was the same for RN's, LPN's, and nursing
assistants.' If the Commissioner's finding 7kk is based on
this group orientation procedure, it would seem to depend
on a subjective interpretation of section 731.2[b][6],
which does not explictly require separate orientations for
each class of nurses. The Commissioner's finding may be
based on other portions of the transcript cited in finding
7kk, but such imprecise findings make impossible peti-
tioners' task of challenging the reasonableness of the find-
ing, especially when as here, it is one of over 50 findings
based on some 2,700 pages of testimony.75
An obviously incensed court went on to rule that,
[a]lthough ordinarily administrative determinations va-
cated for lack of specificity are remanded to the agency
with an opportunity for it to clarify its findings. .. in this
case, given the great burden suffered by petitioners in de-
fending against the myriad (for the most part miniscule)
charges, the respondent is foreclosed from attempting to
remedy its vague findings.74
In two recent cases involving DEC, the adequacy of the
Department's findings was upheld. In Lovett v. Flacke,7 a
water supply decision was challenged on the basis of an as-
serted lack of substantial evidence. In this case, two hydroge-
ologists testified-one for the applicant and one for an inter-
venor-concerning the adequacy of the water supply sought to
be tapped. The finding by the Administrative Law Judge as to
75. Koelbl v. Whalen, 63 A.D.2d 408, 413, 406 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624, appeal denied,
413 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1978).
76. Id.
77. 83 A.D.2d 718, 442 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1981).
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the adequacy of the supply was based upon the account of the
applicant's hyrdogeologist. The testimony of the intervenor's
hydrogeologist was expressly rejected by the Administrative
Law Judge with a justification. On appeal, the court held that
the "choice of conflicting expert testimony in this area was
properly within the discretion of the administrative agency. ''17
The express rejection by the Administrative Law Judge of the
intervenor's expert witness testimony avoided judicial usurpa-
tion of administrative functions. 79 Failure to have explained
why the hydrogeologist's testing was rejected could have re-
sulted in a remand to DEC. 0
In Envtl. Defense Fund v. Flacke (EDF),81 the adequacy
of an FEIS prepared by the Administrative Law Judge con-
cerning the coal conversion of the Orange and Rockland Utili-
ties Lovett facility was challenged. Specifically challenged was
the failure to respond in the Hearing Report/FEIS to testi-
mony of certain witnesses concerning impacts on the Hudson
Highland region due to increased acidification. 2 The Appel-
late Division, after enumerating various references to findings
and conclusions in the hearing report dealing with acid pre-
cipitation and its impacts throughout portions of the North-
east, held that ECL § 8-0109.2 does not require that
the FEIS summarize and respond to the testimony of
every witness presented at these hearings consuming over
7,000 pages of transcript. The FEIS, after its extensive
analysis, arrives at the conclusion that the impact of in-
creased sulfur deposition would be minimal. As noted by
the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 'the
[environmental impact] statement need not achieve scien-
tific unanimity on the desirability of proceeding with the
proposed action '83
78. Id. at 719.
79. See Davis, supra note 51, § 16.05.
80. See Harborlite Corp. v. ICC, 613 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
81. 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1983).
82. Id. at 863.
83. Id. at 863 (citing Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 473 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
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The adequacy of the hearing report in terms of compliance
with SAPA § 307.1 was not raised by the petitioner.
Aside from the cases described above, no New York cases
have been found which specifically require that the basis for
rejection of testimony be stated in the findings. However, not-
withstanding the absence of such precedent, where credibility
plays an important role in the determination of the weight of
testimony of a witness or between two or more witnesses, it
would certainly be beneficial to both the Commissioner and
the reviewing courts for the Administrative Law Judges to set
forth the bases of their reasoning in the findings of fact or the
conclusions."
As a final note, current U.S. Court of Appeals cases for
the Third Circuit involving Social Security disability benefits
have required federal Administrative Law Judges to explain
in their findings the basis for their rejection of relevant evi-
dence or conflicting probative evidence in the record. For ex-
84. In Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Flacke, 94 A.D.2d 69, 464 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1983),
petitioners challenged the validity of a DEC determination which concluded that the
Authority's proposed hydroelectric-pumped storage facility in Prattsville, New York
would violate state water quality standards and effluent limitations. As a result of its
determination, DEC denied the certification of the Authority's proposed facility.
Thus, the Federal Regulatory Commission (FERC) was prohibited by § 401 of the
Federal Water Power and Control Act of 1972, as amended by the Clean Water Act of
1977, from granting the Authority a license for the proposed facility absent certifica-
tion that it would not cause any discharge into the navigable waters.
Upon oral argument of the case, counsel for petitioners argued that the Adminis-
trative Law Judge who presided over the DEC certification hearing failed to rule
upon "any of the Authority's proposed findings of fact or even acknowledge that they
were submitted, thereby violating SAPA § 307(1) as well as Section 624.7(d) of DEC's
own regulations." Brief for Petitioner at 67. Petitioner's counsel also contended that
the Administrative Law Judge made no specific references to the record in his Find-
ings and Conclusions (except to certain attached exhibits in the appendices to the
Decision), and therefore the Authority could "only guess at what portions of the evi-
dence (if any) Respondents had in mind when they made their Decision." Id. at 68.
Lastly, petitioners argued that a reviewing court must examine the record as a
whole to determine if the administrative agency's Decision was based on substantial
evidence. Id. at 92. The implication was that the Administrative Law Judge failed to
adequately assess the credibility of the petitioner's expert witness testimony since he
did not expressly state the basis for its rejection in his report. This point, however,
was not addressed in the court's decision, which originally held in favor of the peti-
tioners, but was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals in Power Auth. of
N.Y. v. Williams, 60 N.Y.2d 315, 457 N.E.2d 726 (1983).
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ample, in Gober v. Matthews,8 5 in its decision remanding the
case before it to the agency for a new hearing, the court held
that
unless the Secretary has analyzed all evidence and has
sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously
probative exhibits, to say that his decision is supported
by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the
court's 'duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to deter-
mine whether the conclusions reached are rational.' 6
Similarly, in Cotter v. Harris (I),87 the court, in formulat-
ing its decision that the Secretary's determination was not
based on substantial evidence, stated that
[tihere are cogent reasons why an administrative decision
should be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory expli-
cation of the basis on which it rests. Chief among them is
the need for the appellate court to perform its statutory
function of judicial review. A statement of reasons or
findings also helps to avoid judicial usurpation of admin-
istrative functions, assures more careful administrative
consideration, and helps the parties plan their cases for
judicial review.88
The court went on to note that,
we need from the ALJ [Administrative Law Judge] not
only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which
supports the result, but also some indication of the evi-
dence which was rejected. In the absence of such an indi-
cation, the reviewing court cannot tell if significant proba-
tive evidence was not credited or simply ignored.8 9
85. 574 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 776 (citing Arnold v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 567 F.2d 258,
259 (4th Cir. 1977)).
87. 642 F.2d 700 (3rd Cir. 1981).
88. Id. at 704-05 (citing K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05 (1958)).
89. Id. at 705.
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On motion for rehearing of claimant's appeal,90 the court
found that its decision in Cotter (I) does not place an "oner-
ous burden" on the Administrative Law Judge and that the
opinion simply requires that the ALJ indicate that s/he
has considered all the evidence .. and provide some ex-
planation of why s/he has rejected probative evidence
which would have suggested a contrary disposition ....
The court's opinion does not require the ALJ to under-
take any additional inquiry, but merely to explain the ba-
sis for the decision to reject evidence which s/he has al-
ready made. 1
In Stewart v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare,92 after
two administrative hearings had already taken place due to a
prior remand by the District Court, the Court of Appeals
again remanded the case because the "ALJ failed to provide
any explanation for his implicit rejection of . . . [claimant's]
testimony regarding the effects of the medication he took."'9
Lastly, in Wallace v. Sec'y of Health and Human Ser-
vices,94 the court remanded the case before it to the agency
"[b]ecause the ALJ either misread the report of Dr. Sibert or
rejected his conclusion without explaining his reasons for do-
ing so . . .95
Although the subject matter of Social Security disability
benefit cases may justify a closer degree of judicial scrutiny
than do DEC licensing and enforcement hearings, the cases
point to the continuing concern of the judiciary that the basis
for administrative decisions be clearly articulated in the body
of the decision itself. The federal cases present a variety of
important practical and legal issues in administrative adjudi-
cation and perhaps should be used as guidelines by adminis-
trative agencies to avoid inappropriate judicial usurpation of
90. Cotter v. Harris (II), 650 F.2d 481 (1981).
91. Id. at 482.
92. 714 F.2d 287 (3rd Cir. 1983)
93. Id. at 290.
94. 722 F.2d 1150 (3rd Cir. 1983).
95. Id. at 1153; see also Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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their administrative decision-making.
IV. Conclusion
The hearing reports prepared by Administrative Law
Judges within DEC serve the following four purposes: as vehi-
cles for the adjudication of contested factual and legal issues;
as main bases for regulatory decisionmaking; as final environ-
mental impact statements (under certain circumstances); and
as legal and technical precedent within DEC. The contents of
the hearing reports are therefore of significant value and im-
portance to the Commissioner of DEC and to the reviewing
courts.
The DEC Commissioner relies heavily on the hearing re-
ports since they become the foundations of the final determi-
nations that are made at the conclusion of enforcement and
permit proceedings. Reviewing courts also rely heavily on the
hearing reports because they become the prime sources for re-
view when determining if the Commissioner's decision was
based upon substantial evidence.
In conclusion, hearing reports fulfill the needs of the deci-
sionmaker and the reviewing courts when Administrative Law
Judges clearly articulate within them the bases for resolution
of the issues in controversy. Although the preparation of
lengthy and detailed hearing reports is tedious and time con-
suming, the ensuing benefits clearly outweigh the initial bur-
densome effort. Adequately prepared hearing reports, in
whatever capacity they serve, will stand up to judicial scrutiny
and deter, if not halt, unwarranted judicial usurpation of ad-
ministrative decision-making.
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